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Editor: D. BarceloThe Precautionary Principle is both celebrated and criticized. It has become an important principle for decision
making, but it is also subject to criticism. One problem that is often pointed out with the principle is that is not
clear what it actually says and how to use it. I have taken on this problem by performing an analysis of some
of the most inﬂuential formulations of the principle in an attempt to identify the core ideas behind it, with the
purpose of producing a formulation of the principle that is clear and practically applicable.
It was found that what is called the Precautionary Principle is not a principle that tells uswhat do to achieve extra
precaution or how to handle situations when extra precaution is called for. Instead, it was found to be a list of
circumstances that each justify extra precaution. An analysis of some of the most common and inﬂuential
formulations of the Precautionary Principle identiﬁed four such circumstances: (1)Whenwedealwith important
values that tend to be systematically downplayed by traditional decision methods – such as human health and
the environment. (2) When we suspect that the decision might lead to irreversible and severe consequences
and the values at stake are also irreplaceable, (3) When timing is at least as important as being right.
(4) When it is more important to avoid false negatives than false positives.
This interpretation of the Precautionary Principle does not say anything about what kind of actions to take when
extra precaution is called for, but it does provide a clear and practically useful list of circumstances that call for
extra precaution and that is not subject to the most common objections to the Precautionary Principle.







The Precautionary Principle has become an important tool for
decision making. This principle is recommended or even prescribed by
many ofﬁcial sources. These include international declarations
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of the European Union, and also national as well as regional and
local legislation in many countries (Ambrus, 2012; Beltrán, 2001;
Commonwealth Consolidated Acts, 1999; Cooney and Dickson, 2005;
Gignon et al., 2013; Gollier and Treich, 2003; Grandjean, 2004;
Grandjean et al., 2004; Herremoës et al., 2001; Lin, 2001; Melin, 2001;
O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995; Osimani, 2013; Purnhagen, 2014; Rio
Declaration, 1992; Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999; Sandin, 2004a,
2004b; Steel, 2015; Turner and Hartzell, 2004;Walsh, 2004;Whiteside,
2006). It has, however also been criticized from a variety of sources and
it remains controversial (Cooney andDickson, 2005;Gignonet al., 2013;
Gollier and Treich, 2003; Grandjean, 2004; Grandjean et al., 2004;
Hermele, 1995; Munthe, 1997; O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995; Osimani,
2013; Sandin, 1999, 2004b; Sandin et al., 2002; Steel, 2015; Turner
and Hartzell, 2004; Whiteside, 2006). The problem that is most
commonly raised is that the principle is unclear (Ambrus, 2012; Gollier
and Treich, 2003; Graham, 2001a, 2001b; Manson, 2002; Mayer et al.,
2002; Osimani, 2013; O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995; Purnhagen, 2014;
Sandin, 1999; Sandin, 2004a; Sandin et al., 2002; Steel, 2015; Turner
and Hartzell, 2004;Whiteside, 2006). In order to deal with that problem,
I will here present a more “tidy” and transparent version of the
Precautionary Principle with deﬁned boundaries for its applicability.
This version of the principle was derived from an analysis of themost
common formulations of the Precautionary Principle, with the aim of
identifying the most basic ideas behind the principle.
The analysis revealed that the basic ideas behind the Precautionary
Principle contrary to popular belief, has nothing to do with where to
place the onus of proof, how certain we need to be that a new invention
is safe before we give green light to use, or how to prioritize between
different risks. Instead, the basic ideas behind the Precautionary
Principle was shown to deal exclusively with which circumstances
that justify extra precaution beyond what would be called for by other
decision procedures. I therefore suggest that the Precautionary Principle
should be interpreted as a list of criteria forwhenwe need extra precau-
tion, not as a principle telling us what to do when we think (for some
reason) that we need extra precaution. It tells us, in other words,
when we need extra safety andwhy, not what to do in these situations.
This does not mean that the Precautionary Principle is useless as a
decision principle. Pinpointing inwhich situationswe need extra safety,
and why this is justiﬁed is extremely important. Although the
formulation presented here is more limited, it is also clearer and
more easy to use, which makes it more, not less, useful in practice
than previous formulations.
2. What does the Precautionary Principle really tell us?
There aremany different formulations of the Precautionary Principle.
The most commonly quoted formulation is from the Rio Declaration
(Referred to among others by Ambrus, 2012; Cooney, 2005; Gollier and
Treich, 2003; Grandjean, 2004; Lin, 2001; Manson, 2002; Melin, 2001;
Osimani, 2013; Sandin, 1999, 2004a, 2006; Sandin et al., 2002; Stijkel
and Reijnders, 1999; Walsh, 2004; Whiteside, 2006):
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
[Rio Declaration (1992)]
The Rio declaration in general leaves much room for interpretation,
and the Precautionary Principle is no exception. There is a large ﬂora
of interpretations, and there is still no real consensus (Cooney and
Dickson, 2005; Sandin, 1999, 2004a). The Rio formulation has also
been criticized for being too weak, and for not really telling us what to
do, but only what not to do (i.e. not to use lack of scientiﬁc certainty
as an excuse for not acting) (Sandin, 2006). It is true that the Rio formu-
lation does not actually tell us what to do but it does provide somethingelse. It points out two situations that differ from “normal” decision situ-
ations and therefore need to be treated differently. The situations that
are pointed out are situations where there is a serious threat and situa-
tions where there is a risk for irreversible damage. What constitutes a
serious threat is still unclear, however.
There are other competing formulations of the Precautionary
Principle and they too are intensely debated (Cooney and Dickson,
2005). One formulation that is often referred to is the so-called
Wingspread formulation (Grandjean, 2004; Osimani, 2013; Sandin,
1999, 2004b, 2006; Turner and Hartzell, 2004; Whiteside, 2006). It
was formulated six years after the Rio formulation at a conference
with a number of scientists, activists, etc. from different countries
(though mostly from North America). It states the principle as follows:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the en-
vironment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientiﬁcally.
[Wingspread Conference (1998)]
Contrary to the Rio formulation, the Wingspread formulation
is stated as a positive prescription. In practice this does not make
much of a difference, however, since it does not tell us what kinds
of measures we should take, other than that they should be precaution-
ary. Like the Rio formulation, it concentrates on telling us which
situations call for extra precaution. Here, it is somewhat more speciﬁc
than the Rio formulation, however. It also includes human health
among the relevant considerations. This was not mentioned by the Rio
formulation.
Also other formulations seem to point in about the same direction
even though they differ in the details (Gollier and Treich, 2003).
Grandjean et al. (2004) interpret the Precautionary Principle as:
… a tool for avoiding possible future harm associated with
suspected, but not conclusive, environmental risks.
Just like the Rio formulation and the Wingspread formulation,
Grandjean et al. abstain from providing any advice on what to actually
do to avoid possible future harm, not to mention a tool for doing so.
Just like the two previouslymentioned formulations, it instead provides
us with criteria for when to take suchmeasures. In this case, the criteria
is that we stand before suspected but not conclusive future harm that is
associated with environmental risk. Exactly what degree of suspicion is
called for is not speciﬁed, however.
Per Sandin deﬁnes the core idea of the Precautionary Principle
as follows:
… on some occasions, measures against a possible hazard should be
taken even if the available evidence does not sufﬁce to treat the ex-
istence of that hazard as a scientiﬁcally established fact (Sandin,
2004a, similarly stated in Sandin et al., 2002 and Sandin, 2004b).
Just like the others, Sandin does not specify which measures to
take but he does give us a clue for under which conditions such
measures are called for, namely when we face a possible hazard
that is not scientiﬁcally established.
Whiteside presents an interpretation that is a bit more elaborate
than the others, but the basic ideas seem to be the same:
… the precautionary idea in risk regulation is at work whenever
authorities take early preventive measures to forestall a potential,
irreversible danger, even though causal links in the chain leading
to that danger have not yet been ﬁrmly scientiﬁcally established.
[Whiteside (2006)]
Again, nothing is said about which measures to take but it is
indicated in which types of situations they are motivated. In this
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not scientiﬁcally established danger that is also irreversible.
Timothy O′Riordan's and Andrew Jordan's interpretation reads:
At the core of the Precautionary Principle is the intuitively simple
idea that decision makers should act in advance of scientiﬁc certain-
ty to protect the environment (andwith it thewell-being interests of
future generations) from incurring harm.
[O'Riordan and Jordan (1995)]
This version is like the others a listing of situations in which extra
precaution is called for. It points out threat to the environment and
future generations and just as was the case with several of the other
interpretations it stresses lack of scientiﬁc certainty. Like all the other in-
terpretations it also abstains from pointing out what kind of measures
that should be taken in these situations.
These are some examples of how different authors have tried to
identify the core of the Precautionary Principle. The formulations differ,
but they also seem to have some basic ideas in common. In the coming
sections I will try to identify these ideas and determine if they can
justify that we at some occasions take precautionary measures that
for instance go beyond what a standard cost-beneﬁt analysis would
recommend.
One noticeable feature of all these formulations is that they all
specify under what circumstances precautionary methods should be
taken, but they do not specify which measures should be taken.
Based on these formulations, I therefore suggest that the Precautionary
Principle is actually a list of circumstances that are supposed to justify
extra precaution compared to what is typically recommended by
standard decision methods such as cost-beneﬁt analyses. It does
not come through as a complete decision model that recommends
particular measures. This is important to remember both when using
the principle and when trying to criticize it.3. The value of human health and the environment
It is sometimes claimed that values like human health and the
environment tend to be downplayed in traditional decision procedures
(See e.g. Turner and Hartzell, 2004; Wingspread Conference, 1998).
Threats against human health or the environment are also explicitly
stated in many formulations of the Precautionary Principle (Cooney
and Dickson, 2005; Gollier and Treich, 2003; O'Riordan and Jordan,
1995; Sandin, 1999, 2006; Turner and Hartzell, 2004; Wandall, 2004).
This indicates that one of the ideas behind the principle is
that human health and the environment need to be better protected
than has been the case in traditional decision procedures and that a
precautionary approach is needed to achieve that.
In cases were human health and the environment competes with
other values, some kind of trade-off must be done. Maybe one motive
behind the Precautionary Principle is to be found in the way the trade-
off between things such as human health and the environment on one
hand and other values on the other, is normally done. It seems that
the value people place on the former is ascending, and itmight therefore
be that when economists and decision makers make comparisons
between them and other values, human health and the environment
are assigned a value that is too low. Some authors believe that
problems in connection with the trade-off between different values
are a major motive behind the Precautionary Principle (O'Riordan and
Jordan, 1995).
The question that immediately arises is whether this change in value
cannot be dealt with in a simpler way by just assigning a higher value to
the environment and human health in ordinary cost-beneﬁt analyses.
The answer is that this may not help since the problemmay be inherent
in the model. The entire decision procedure seems to be biased to
the advantage of values that can be traded on the market and tothe disadvantage of values that cannot, like human health and the
environment.
In order to be ﬁtted into existing decision models, values that are
not traded on the market have to be translated into monetary value in
some more or less artiﬁcial way (Chee, 2004; Costanza et al., 1997;
Herendeen, 1998; Naidoo and Ricketts, 2006; Sukhdev, 2010).
How this should be done is far from clear, however. Values like the
environment and human health are notoriously difﬁcult to express in
monetary terms. Some even claim that it is genuinely impossible. Even
so, it is frequently done, though the usefulness of the results is debated
(Attﬁeld, 1998; Barbier, 1994; Costanza and Folke, 1997; Chan et al.,
2012; Chee, 2004; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Garrod and Willis,
1999; Ludwig, 2000; Neurath, 1973; O'Neill, 2002; Owen et al., 2009;
Payne et al., 1992; Plottu and Plottu, 2007; Randall, 1988; Raymond
et al., 2013; Samples and Hollyer, 1990; Steel, 2015; Söderbaum, 1987,
1994; Wilson and Howarth, 2002). If it is not possible to correctly ac-
count for the value of human health and the environment in monetary
terms, then cost-beneﬁt analyses will be systematically misleading in
trade-offs were these values are involved. This uncertainty whether
the value of things like human health and the environment can be
correctly accounted for in monetary terms seems like a good example
of a special situation that clearly justiﬁes extra precaution.
An example of such a situation could be when a pipeline for oil is
drawn across a sensitive nature area. In this case, the Precautionary
Principle would tell us a. that more precaution is called for than when
the pipeline is drawn in an area where a leak would cause less havoc
to human health or the environment, and b. thatmore precaution is jus-
tiﬁed than what would be recommended by a cost-beneﬁt analysis
that compares the cost of precaution with the negative value (or the
expected negative value) of a leak, where the negative value is based
on a mix of economic value (the cost of ﬁxing the leak, cleaning up
after the leak, etc.) and a contingent valuation of the nature in the area.
The reason for talking about values ‘like’ or ‘such as’ human health
and the environment is that on one hand, these are the only values
that are speciﬁcally mentioned by the most inﬂuential formulations of
the Precautionary Principle, on the other hand, human health and the
environment are not the only values that are not traded on the market.
In order to be true to the purpose of this investigation and formulate the
basic ideas of the Precautionary Principle based on an analysis of the
standard formulations of the principle, I will sufﬁce with including
those values explicitly mentioned in these formulations (that is, the
environment and human health), but it might be that future
improvements of the principle should include also other values in
the same situation.
It might be objected that an urge to take extra precaution in situa-
tions where human health or the environment is threatened can lead
to contradictions. For this formulation of the Precautionary Principle,
this is not the case, however. It is true that in certain situations it can
urge us to take extra precaution against a potential threat to the envi-
ronment, where the threat consists of an action that is taken to protect
human health. Consider for example the use of a pesticide that is used to
ﬁght a parasite that causes large amounts of suffering and deaths among
humans. Imagine that the pesticide also causes havoc in the ecosystem.
In this case we are dealing with two competing values that both fulﬁl
the criteria for special concern. What does the Precautionary Principle
tell us to do in this situation? Remember that the Precautionary Princi-
ple is not a tool for making trade-offs and it does not tell us that certain
values should always be promoted or protected over other values,
or that some things are more valuable than others. It does therefore
not tell us to minimize the risk for either human health or the environ-
ment on the other's expense. The Precautionary Principle can thus not
tell us whether the negative value of the human suffering and death
from the parasite that occurs today is higher (and in that case how
much higher) or lower (and in that case, how much lower) than the
value of the undamaged ecosystem. What it tells us, is that no matter
how you make the trade-off, you have to take more precaution to
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Exactly how to do that involved too many variables (what technologies
are available, what is the income level of the population, what species is
the ecosystemmade up of, what is the typicalwind direction in the area,
etc.) to bake into a general principle. It might be that we need to choose
an alternative way of protecting health of the human population,
it might be that we should use the pesticide but only during
certain times of the year or outside of certain areas, for instance.
The point is that we, in a case like this, need to spend more (money,
time, or other resources) on precaution for both the human health
and the environment than would be justiﬁed by a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
4. Irreversibility
Irreversibility is mentioned in several formulations of the
Precautionary Principle, including the Rio formulation (see e.g. Attﬁeld,
1998; Herremoës et al., 2001; O'Riordan and Jordan, 1995; Rio
Declaration, 1992; Rolston, 1988; Whiteside, 2006; World Commission
on Environment and Development, 1987). Can irreversibility be such a
big problem that it grants extra precaution beyond what would be
prescribed by for instance a cost-beneﬁt analysis?
A complicating factorwhen it comes to assessing the role of irrevers-
ibility in the Precautionary Principle is that none of the standard formu-
lations specify exactly what they mean by ‘irreversibility’. A process can
be more or less difﬁcult to reverse. How difﬁcult does it have to be
before we call it ‘irreversible’ and give it a special status? Is it enough
that it is too difﬁcult or expensive for the decision makers to be willing
to take the risk? Does it have to be impossible with existing technology,
or with any technology that is plausible within a reasonable future (and
what does that mean), or does it have to be impossible per deﬁnition?
(An example of the latter would be an extinct species deﬁned according
to a species concept based on historical lineages. If the lineage is cut off,
the species is extinct forever, even if it would be possible to recreate an
exact copy of a member of the species.)
I will not here take a stand on exactly where to draw the line (see
Manson, 2007 for a more in depth discussion). Though in order to
construct a practically useful principle, I suggest that ‘irreversible’
when used as a part of the Precautionary Principle, is deﬁned in relation
to the value at stake and in terms of what is practically possible in the
situation in question.
Manson (2002) mentions a test case that the reference to irrevers-
ibility in the Precautionary Principle should be able to handle: “Consider
a decisionmaker confronted with the proposal to dam a river. He or she
knows that the damwill result in the death of all of the native trout, but
also knows that in the future the dam can be removed and the river re-
stockedwith non-native trout.”He asks, is the effect irreversible or not?
In this case, it all depends on which is the value at stake, which in
turn is a question that has to answered by the stakeholders (it cannot
be answered by science or by any decision principle). If the value at
stake is the presence of native trout (or possibly the future existence
of the native trout if this is its only habitat), then the answer given the
assumptions of Manson's example, is that the process is irreversible. If
the value at stake is the presence of some subspecies of trout, or the
value assigned to the ﬁsh in question is simply nutritional or economic,
it might not be irreversible.When Per Sandin discusses irreversibility as
an aspect of precaution, he describes it as one of three aspects of ‘threat’
that are relevant for our understanding of the Precautionary Principle.
The three aspects are: Severity, irreversibility and preventability
(Sandin, 1999). If a threat is not preventable (that is, if it is inevitable),
it is meaningless to take precautionary measures (it would not
even be possible to identify any measures as being precautionary).
Preventability is therefore a necessary prerequisite for any talk about
precaution or risk management in general. That severity is relevant
seems intuitively plausible as well. The more severe an outcome is,
the more important it must be to take precautionary measures against
it. It is also intuitively plausible that a certain degree of severity is anecessary prerequisite for invoking precautionary measures. An event
that is irreversible but not negative at all hardly calls for precaution,
and an event that is only slightly negative but can quite easily be
counterbalanced by the positive effects that you get from the process
that causes the irreversible change, should reasonably be treated as
one value among others and be dealt with in a normal cost-beneﬁt
analysis. Sandin illustrates the importance of severity by an example
of a boulder that is crushed in order to get gravel (Sandin, 1999). This
is clearly an irreversible act, but it can hardly be described as severe.
In fact, irreversibility might even on some occasions be a good thing.
If we manage to get permanently rid of some great evil, it is surely
something positive and the irreversibility of the outcome makes it
more, not less positive.
So far it seems that irreversibility cannot be a sufﬁcient reason for
invoking extra precaution. It has to occur in combination with some
degree of severity (in addition to the obvious criteria of preventability).
On the other hand, whenwe dealwith a possible effect that is highly
negative (severe), and it turns out to be irreversible aswell, the irrevers-
ibility may well be a factor that enhances the problem to such a degree
that it gives the problem a special status that compels us to take extra
precaution.
One might want to argue that since it is not speciﬁed which degree
of severity is needed to evoke the Precautionary Principle, it is not
very useful. I would like to argue, on the other hand, that a principle
that pretends to be able to settle that question should be viewed with
great suspicion since it contains a value judgement that should be
reserved for the stakeholders, and not pre-decided by someone else
and hidden in a general principle, and thereby pushing one person's
valuation onto everyone who uses the principle. By this I do not mean
that science can be totally value free, or that values cannot be subject
to objective analysis. My point is instead that everyone who is
concerned by a decision must have a say in that decision, and that the
question of how valuable or how severe something is as well as the
question of deciding how valuable or severe something has to be to
grant extra precaution are exactly the right places for this.
We still have to ask ourselves, however, why this combination of ir-
reversibility and severity cannot behandled by for instance determining
howmuchmore negative a negative effect becomes if it is also irrevers-
ible, and then add this additional value to the negative value of the effect
as such and then it with a common cost-beneﬁt analysis. The irrevers-
ibility issue goes deeper than this, however. Per Sandin compares the
Precautionary Principle with a decision principle used by insurance
companies. When making business decisions, the insurance companies
try to “…maximize expected monetary value, but only if bankruptcy is
not one of the possible outcomes.” (Sandin, 2004a). This seems like a
sensible decision principle: Use cost-beneﬁt analyses but make no
decisions that if they fail will result in bankruptcy.
The question is: What makes bankruptcy so special? Irreversibility
probably plays a substantial part: It is bad if we lose money on a deal,
but we can come back and make money on another deal. It is also a
pity if we stay out of a deal that would have rendered us a great proﬁt,
but we can, in general, make money on another deal (even though we
have lost some opportunity value by opting out of this deal). If we go
bankrupt on the other hand, it is over. It is true that all business oppor-
tunities are irreversible in aweak sense,meaning that this particular op-
portunity will never come back. In fact, in a veryweak sense, everything
that happens is irreversible because of (what seems to be) the fact that
time is a one-way street (often deﬁned in terms of the law of entropy as
time moving in the direction in which entropy increases) (Manson,
2002, 2007). A bankruptcy seems to be irreversible in a stronger
sense, however, since it means not just that this particular event cannot
be undone (the very weak sense), or even that a particular opportunity
will not come back (the weak sense), but that the company can never
do business again at all. From the point of view of the company (if we
pretend for a moment that there is such a thing as the point of view of
a company), it makes sense to consider this a special case, though
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members of the society this is not necessarily the case. The employees
can get new jobs and the owner of the company can start a new compa-
ny even in the same branch. This means that from the point of view
of the society, the bankruptcy of a company might not grant any extra
precautionary measures. Things would be different, however, if this
company was also, for some reason, irreplaceable. Maybe it would be
impossible for the country to replace the lost jobs, or maybe it would
make the country dependant on foreign import of some strategic com-
modity. It is therefore the combination of being irreversible and irre-
placeable in relation to some important end value, such as important
ecosystem services, or things that have value as ends in themselves,
that makes it a special case. Ordinary cost-beneﬁt analyses based on
expected value may well be the most rational decision method when
we talk about “ordinary” events such as recurring economic deals.
In these cases, expected value is probably a good account of the long-
term gain or loss, and extremes that happen quite seldom are, in gener-
al, outweighed in the long term by the sum of the smaller but more
common events. On the other hand, if we talk about something that
cannot be allowed to happen even once, it seems rational to adopt an
alternative strategy for decision-making.
The conclusion is that irreversibility is not on its own sufﬁcient for
extra precautionary measures to be justiﬁed. However, when the
outcome is in the form of a severe loss that is not just irreversible but
also irreplaceable, this puts it in a special category that calls for extra
precaution.
Irreplaceability is notmentioned in any of the standard formulations
of the Precautionary Principle but since it is necessary to make sense of
the focus on irreversibility. I conclude that it is justiﬁed to include it.
5. The cost of being late
All the formulations of the Precautionary Principle quoted above talk
about the importance of not waiting for conclusive evidence before
taking measures. This may look at ﬁrst sight as an attack on the rules
of science. This is not the case, however. This idea has to do with how
to use science in rational decision making, not with how science should
be done as such.
This idea can be divided into two different criteria for whenwe need
extra precaution. One that has to do with timing and that tells us that
when we are in possession of scientiﬁc evidence that indicates a risk,
then we should not wait until we have a complete understanding of
the situation before we act. The other tells us that even though false
positives are typically worse for the epistemic values that rule science
than false negatives, this is not always the case for the society in general.
This in turn means that in some cases we need to use the scientiﬁc
results differently when we are about to make decision about non-
epistemic values compared to if we are to decide whether to include a
result in the scientiﬁc corpus. I will discuss these two ideas in this and
the next section. I will start with the time aspect.
Many formulations of the Precautionary Principle mention the
importance of considering the value of what we might lose if we do
not take measures. This looks reasonable but is not sufﬁcient to form a
justiﬁcation for not waiting for a more complete scientiﬁc understand-
ing. That it is important to consider the values at stake can just as well
be an argument for taking the extra time needed to make sure that
an intervention does not worsen the situation. In order to get to the
conclusion that we should not wait, we need an additional argument
stressing the importance of timingwhen it comes to securing the values
in question.
Traditionally an economically proﬁtable substance or process can
only be banned or regulated on behalf of other values like human health
if we have very strong evidence of the risks posed to these values by the
substance or process in question. Gathering the necessary evidence
may take time, however, and much can happen during this time
(Herremoës et al., 2001; McGarvin, 2001; Sandin, 1999). The situationcan grow much worse and irreversible damage may occur (Osimani,
2013;Whiteside, 2006). In recent history, both people and the environ-
ment have often suffered (and in many cases still suffer) unnecessary
harm because the decision makers have waited for more conclusive
evidence before dealing with a problem, and there is reason to believe
that this problem is much more common than the opposite problem
of regulating too fast (Steel, 2015). The European Environment Agency
(EEA) report on the Precautionary Principle Late lessons from early
warnings (Herremoës et al., 2001) describes several such cases in detail.
The content as well as the title of the report states very clearly that the
editors and authors consider time loss to be a very importantmotivation
for the Precautionary Principle (Herremoës et al., 2001). Benzene, as-
bestos, and lead additives in petrol are some well-known examples
(Beltrán, 2001; Gee and Greenberg, 2001; Grandjean et al., 2004;
Infante, 2001), If we had not waited so long for conclusive proof
that these chemicals are harmful, we could have banned them earlier
and avoided some of their long-term effects (For more examples, see
Cooney, 2005; Grandjean et al., 2004; Herremoës et al., 2001; Ibarreta
and Swan, 2001; Koppe and Keys, 2001; von Krauss and Herremoës,
2001; Lambert, 2001; Steel, 2015).
The time factor is especially important when dealing with complex
things like ecosystems or the human body. The effects often do not
show until the substance or process has been in use for a while
(Farman, 2001; Gee and Greenberg, 2001; Gollier and Treich, 2003;
Ibarreta and Swan, 2001; von Krauss and Herremoës, 2001; Osimani,
2013; Rolston, 1988). This means that we will not have conclusive evi-
dence that a substance is dangerous until it is already in the system
(maybe in large quantities) and we may have to live with the problem
for a long time. When we deal with non-linear relations and complex
systems such as ecosystems and the human body, it is also very difﬁcult
to establish a clear cause-effect relationship and we may have to wait
even longer than normal for conclusive evidence (Whiteside, 2006).
The idea that we under certain circumstances should not wait
for conclusive evidence before taking action might seem irrational, but
is in fact a very rational decision rule. All decision-makers worthy of
the epithet, from stock traders to military commanders, know that
even though it is important to have accurate information, it is also
important to act in time. If we are too late, perfect information is to no
avail. We must therefore conclude that taking action before we have
conclusive evidence in situations when timing is of the essence, is not
only acceptable, but morally and rationally required.
Maybe the tendency to give an unreasonably high priority to
accurateness over acting in time, has been uncritically adopted by
society from the realm of science, where knowledge and understanding
as such are the ultimate goals. Decision makers need information, and
the best way of getting reliable information is to turn to those who
have the formation of knowledge as their ultimate goal, that is, to
science. However, since the goals of society in general are not exactly
the same as the goal of science, we need a transformation rule. I believe
it is very important that this is not done by changing the rules or the aims
of science. Instead, we need to foster an understanding among both
scientists and decision makers that the aims are different and that it is
therefore perfectly rational to have different criteria for when to add a
statement to our scientiﬁcworldview and forwhen to act to save an im-
portant value, and that abstaining from acting to save an important
value because the evidence is not strong enough to change our scientiﬁc
worldview is not sound science, it is bad decision making.
Whatwe also have to remember, is that the idea here is not to ignore
knowledge already produced by science. Neither is it that we should act
without any knowledge at all. The idea is rather that we need to ﬁnd a
balance between certainty and timing. How to ﬁnd this balance in
each particular situation is a delicate problem that will not be solved
here. The basic idea that the different goals of science and society
imply different demands on where to ﬁnd this balance, is none the
less important to acknowledge and to apply in decision making to the
best of one's ability.
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tant to be in time than to be exactly right. The standard formulations of
the Precautionary Principle that form the basis for this investigation do
not specify that. This can be seen as a problem since it might make the
principle less useful for deciding whether a certain situation is a situa-
tion where extra precaution is called for or not. This problem cannot
be solved by analysing the standard formulations, but once the core
ideas have been identiﬁed, it will be possible to continue to build on
them to make them more useful. Another way of looking at the fact
that it is not speciﬁed exactly when it is more important to be in time
than to be exactly right is that it is a reﬂection of the realworld. How im-
portant something is, is ultimately a question of values and needs to be
negotiated by the stakeholders involved in each particular case, and not
pre-determined by a general principle.
6. False positives versus false negatives
Scientists do not like to be wrong. In the world of science, making a
claim that turns out to be wrong is, in general, worse than abstaining
from making a claim that later turns out to be true. This means that
scientists tend to be biased to err in favour of false negatives over false
positives (Gee and Greenberg, 2001; Grandjean, 2004; Herremoës
et al., 2001; Wandall, 2004).
Birgitte Wandall calls the bias towards false negatives the
“conservative burden of proof”, since it confers the burden of proof
on those whomake a positive claim (Wandall, 2004). She also points
out that the reason for this tendency is probably that one of the main
values guiding science (epistemic values) is to keep the scientiﬁc corpus
(the body of statements accepted by science) as free as possible from
false statements (Wandall, 2004). This is the scientiﬁc community's
own version of “erring on the side of caution”, and it is doubtlessly a
good reason to trust science: If something is claimed by the scientiﬁc
community to be true, it probably is true. This also means, however,
that if the scientiﬁc community does not want to exclaim something
as true, it does not necessarily mean that it is false. To believe that it
does seems to be an all too common mistake that in some situations
can cause a good deal of harm (Whiteside, 2006). It is, after all, not ob-
vious that the goal of avoiding false positives is always a superordinate
goal in society at large. In many cases where other values are at stake,
false negatives can have at least as severe effects as false positives. The
effects of not regulating or banning something that is dangerous can
be at least as bad as the effects of regulating or banning something
that is harmless. If we accept the idea that human health and the envi-
ronment (and possibly also other values like them) need to be assigned
a higher value than has traditionally been the case, it is probably in
many cases more important to avoid false negatives than to avoid
false positives when these values are at stake (Wandall, 2004). We
therefore have a case that is parallel to the idea discussed above regard-
ing the value of acting in time. The conclusion must also be the same:
We need a decision rule that can compensate for the difference in
goals between science and practical decision making (for a discussion
of the goals of science, see Wandall, 2004). The Precautionary Principle
seems to be precisely cut out for that job. The cost of false negatives for a
host of values, including human health and the environment seem, just
like the cost connected with losing time, to be a strong argument in
favour of precaution. Just as it is sometimes more important to act in
time than being exactly right, it is sometimes more important to avoid
false negatives than to avoid false positives – depending on the values
at stake.
It is therefore reasonable to handle this idea in a similar way: When
we make decisions in matters where some important value is at stake
and whenwe suspect that a certain decision may result in serious dam-
age to this value, andwhen a false negative would be amore substantial
threat to the protection or promotion of this value than a false positive,
thenwe shouldmove our priorities from being biased towards avoiding
false positives in the direction of avoiding false negatives.It is important to note that it is not a matter of going from a sys-
tem that is totally immune to false positives to one that is totally
immune to false negatives. A system immune to false positives
would not produce any statements about the world at all (only an-
alytical statements would pass the test); while a system that is im-
mune to false negatives would not be able to exclude anything
other than pure contradictions. Everything else would be consid-
ered possible, and no possibility could ever be excluded from our
considerations. What we need is a shift of focus from a bias against
false positives in the direction of decreasing the risk of false
negatives in situations where false negatives would have worse
consequences than false positives. Just as with the importance of
being in time, this should not affect the epistemic values inherent
in science, that is, it should not affect which statements are to be
included in the scientiﬁc corpus, only how scientiﬁc ﬁndings are
to be used in society where other values are at stake. Just like
with the previous idea, it is perfectly rational to adjust our criteria
to ﬁt our goals and it would in fact be irrational and unjustiﬁable
not to do it.
Just as was the case with the importance of being in time, it was not
possible to draw any conclusions form the standard formulations about
when in fact it is more important to avoid false negatives than false
positives. This question therefore has to be left to future work, or be
left to be worked out in each particular case based on discussion
between stakeholders regarding the values at stake.
Imagine for instance a case where a county considers whether to
implant a new ﬁsh species in a lake. The ﬁsh species has recently
become very popular with anglers and has created both jobs and
tax revenues in another county where the ﬁsh occurs naturally.
The lake where we plan to implant the ﬁsh is located in an area
with a relatively high unemployment rate and no other exploitable
resources. The ecosystem in the lake in question is different form
the lake where the ﬁsh occurs naturally. An investigation
performed by a consultancy ﬁrm has concluded that the environ-
ment is none the less suitable for this species. A nature conserva-
tion organisation has expressed worries about whether the
species might be invasive and they got support from researchers
at a nearby university who state that since this ﬁsh species has
not been introduced in this kind of environment before, there is
no positive evidence that it will be invasive, but that this case is in
certain respects similar to other cases where implanted species
have turned out to be invasive. The only way to conﬁrm the suspi-
cion and be able to say for certain that this particular ﬁsh species
would be invasive in this particular environment. Is this a case
where it is more important to avoid a false negative statement
than a false positive? The answer obviously depends on which
end result is least preferable. In this case we have indications that
the species might be invasive but nothing that can be considered
a scientiﬁcally sound proof. The question of which outcome is the
least preferable, a devastated ecosystem or a foregone chance to
create a ﬂowering tourism industry in the area depends on too
many unknown variables to be summarised in a general principle.
It also includes the question of how different stakeholders value
the different options. These are questions that cannot be answered
by any reasonable formulation of the Precautionary Principle. The
Precautionary Principle is not, and cannot be a tool for prioritizing
between values. A reasonable formulation, like the one provided
here, can however tell us which kind of situations we need to look
out for. In this case situations where it is at least as important to
avoid false negative statements as false positive statements.
7. Summary and conclusions
By analysing the most inﬂuential formulations of the Precautionary
Principle I have identiﬁed four basic ideas behind the principle. All of
them are ideas about which circumstances that justify extra precaution
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Each of these ideas is analysed separately, and the analysis shows that
each one of them is independently sufﬁcient to justify extra precaution.
In fact, the four core ideas all describe cases where extra precaution is
the only rational alternative.
The four items on the list provide sound justiﬁcation for extra
precaution beyondwhat would follow from standard decision methods
such as cost-beneﬁt analyses under any of the following circumstances:
⁎ When we deal with important values that tend to be systematically
downplayed by traditional decision methods – such as (but not
necessarily exclusively) human health and the environment.
⁎ When we suspect that the decision might lead to irreversible
and severe consequences, and where the values at stake are
also irreplaceable.
⁎ When timing is at least as important as being right.
⁎ When it is more important to avoid false negatives than
false positives.The conclusion is therefore that the Precautionary Principle is
actually a list of circumstances where it is justiﬁed to take extra precau-
tion beyond what traditional decision methods would recommend.
This means that it is not just the question of what measures to
take when extra precaution is called for that goes unanswered in
this formulation. It also fails to provide any objective standard for
when the four circumstances pointed out by the core ideas, occur.
In the ﬁrst case, when human health or the environment is threatened,
it can be seen as a given. In other cases such aswhen it ismore important
to avoid false positives than false negatives or when it is more important
to be in time than being exactly right, it is not speciﬁed when that is.
The principle says for instance that extra precaution is called for when
it is more important to be in time than to be exactly right, but it
does not tell uswhen it ismore important to be in time than to be exactly
right.
The reasonwhy no objective criteria is speciﬁed in the core ideas
is that none of the standard formulations make any speciﬁcations of
that kind. This can be seen as a weakness in the principle but also as
strength in that it provides room for discussion about the values at
stake in each respective case. Either way, it could be perceived to
view this rather stripped down formulation of the Precautionary
Principle as fulﬁlling the aim stated in the introduction of a formu-
lation of the Precautionary Principle that is “more useful in prac-
tice”. I believe, however, that a principle that is clear within given
boundaries is more useful than a principle that has no other wider
boundaries but is helplessly fuzzy.
Having identiﬁed the core ideas behind the Precautionary Principle
is also very helpful if we want to continue to develop the principle,
though there is also another alternative, and that is to settle with deﬁn-
ing the Precautionary Principle as tool for deciding under which general
circumstances extra precaution is justiﬁed, and leave the remaining
questions to be dealt with by other decision methods. I will here leave
the question open for which path to take, though I lean towards the sec-
ond alternative for two reasons. 1. (Referring to the lack of objective
criteria for when the circumstances occur). This is basically a question
of values and it seems more democratic to leave this to the democratic
process rather than including it in a general principle masquerading
as objective criteria. 2. (Referring to the lack of advice for which
precautionary measures to take). There is a virtually inﬁnite number
of possible measures to take to decrease risk and which measure that
is best for the job seems to depend on a number of variables that shift
from case to case.
A bonus result of the investigation is that much of the common
objections of the Precautionary Principle can be shown to be
misdirected since they typically aim at what the Precautionary
Principle supposedly tells us to do, for example to reverse the burden
of proof, to demand proof of a negative, to ignore or downplay
science, or to favour status quo.References
Ambrus, M., 2012. The precautionary principle and a fair allocation of the burden of proof
in international environmental law. Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law 21, 259–270.
Attﬁeld, R., 1998. Environmental ethics and intergenerational equity. Inquiry 41, 207–422.
Barbier, E.B., 1994. Valuing environmental functions: tropical wetlands. Land Econ.
70, 155–173.
Beltrán, D.J., 2001. Preface. In: Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early
Warnings – The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000. Copenhagen: European
Environment Agency, pp. 3–5.
Chan, K.M.A., Satterﬁeld, T., Goldstein, J., 2012. Rethinking ecosystem services to better
address and navigate cultural values. Ecol. Econ. 74, 8–18.
Chee, Y.E., 2004. An ecological perspective on the valuation of ecosystem services. Biol.
Conserv. 120, 549–565.
Commonwealth Consolidated Acts: Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation act 1999 - Sect 391. http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/
au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s391.html, 2009 Accessed (2014.10.20).
Cooney R. From promise to practicalities: the precautionary principle in biodiversity
conservation and sustainable use. In: Cooney R. Dickson B, editors. Biodiversity &
the Precautionary Principle. London: Earthscan; 2005. p. 3–17.
Cooney, R., Dickson, B. (Eds.), 2005. Biodiversity & the Precautionary Principle.
Earthscan, London.
Costanza, R., Folke, C., 1997. Valuing ecosystem services with efﬁciency, fairness and
sustainability as goals. In: Daily, G.C. (Ed.), Nature's Services: Societal Dependence
on Natural Ecosystems. Island Press, Washington, pp. 49–68.
Costanza, R., et al., 1997. The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural capital.
Nature 387, 253–260.
Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A., 1994. Contingent valuation: is some number better than no
number? J. Econ. Perspect. 8, 45–64.
Farman, J., 2001. Halocarbons, the ozone layer and the precautionary principle. In:
Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, pp. 76–83.
Garrod, G., Willis, K.G., 1999. Economic Valuation of the Environment. Edward Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham.
Gee, D., Greenberg, M., 2001. Asbestos – from magic to malevolent material. In:
Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000. Copenhagen, European Environment Agency, pp. 52–63.
Gignon, M., et al., 2013. The precautionary principle: is it safe. European Journal of Health
Law 20, 261–270.
Gollier, C., Treich, N., 2003. Decision-making under scientiﬁc uncertainty – the economics
of the precautionary principle. J. Risk Uncertain. 27, 77–103.
Graham, D., 2001a. A future for the precautionary principle? J. Risk Res. 4, 109–111.
Graham, D., 2001b. Decision-analytic reﬁnements of the precautionary principle. J. Risk
Res. 4, 127–141.
Grandjean, P., 2004. Implications of the precautionary principle for primary prevention
and research. Annu. Rev. Public Health 25, 199–223.
Grandjean, P., et al., 2004. Implications of the precautionary principle in research and
policy-making. Am. J. Ind. Med. 45, 482–485.
Herendeen, R.A., 1998. Monetary-costing environmental service: nothing is lost,
something is gained. Ecol. Econ. 25, 29–30.
Hermele, K., 1995. Ekonomerna, tillväxten och miljön. Carlssons, Stockholm.
Herremoës, P., et al., 2001. Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen.
Ibarreta, D., Swan, S.H., 2001. The DES story – long-term consequences of prenatal
exposure. In: Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The
Precautionary Principle 1896–2000. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen,
pp. 84–92.
Infante, P.F., 2001. Benzene – an historical perspective on the American and European
occupational setting. In: Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early
Warnings – The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000. European Environment Agency,
Copenhagen, pp. 38–51.
Koppe, J.G., Keys, J., 2001. PCBs and the precautionary principle. In: Herremoës, P., et al.
(Eds.), Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000.
European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, pp. 64–75.
Lambert, B., 2001. Radiation – early warning; late effects. In: Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.),
Late lessons from early warnings – the precautionary principle 1896–2000.
European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, pp. 31–37.
Lin, J.C., 2001. The precautionary principle – a rose by another name. IEEE Antennas and
Propagation Magazine 43, 129–131.
Ludwig, D., 2000. Limitations of economic valuation of ecosystems. Ecosystems 3, 31–35.
Manson, N.A., 2002. Formulating the precautionary principle. Environ. Ethics 24,
263–274.
Manson, N.A., 2007. The concept of irreversibility: its use in the sustainable development
and precautionary principle literatures. Electr. J. Sustain. Dev. 1, 3–15.
Mayer, B., Brown, P., Linder, M., 2002. Moving further upstream: from toxics reduction to
the precautionary principle. Public Health Rep. 117, 574–586.
McGarvin, M., 2001. Fisheries – taking stock. In: Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late
Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary Principle 1896–2000. European
Environment Agency, Copenhagen, pp. 17–30.
Melin, A., 2001. Judgements in Equilibrium? – An Ethical Analysis of Environmental
Impact Assessment. Linköping University, Linköping.
Munthe, C., 1997. Etiska aspekter på jordbruk. Jordbruksverket, Jönköping.
Naidoo, R., Ricketts, T.H., 2006. Mapping the economic costs and beneﬁts of conservation.
PLoS Biol. 4 (11), 2153–2164, e360.
Neurath, O., 1973. Empiricism and Sociology. Reidel, Dordrecht.
141E. Persson / Science of the Total Environment 557–558 (2016) 134–141O'Neill, J., 2002. Socialist calculation and Environmental valuation: money, markets and
ecology. Science & Society 66, 137–151.
O'Riordan, T., Jordan, A., 1995. The precautionary principle in contemporary environmen-
tal politics. Environ. Values 4, 191–212.
Osimani, B., 2013. The precautionary principle in the pharmaceutical domain: a philo-
sophical enquiry into probabilistic reasoning and risk aversion. Health, Risk & Society
15, 123–143.
Owen, R.J., et al., 2009. Capturing old-growth values for use in forest decision-making.
J. Environ. Manag. 43, 237–248.
Payne, J., et al., 1992. Behavioural decision research: a constructive processing
perspective. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 43, 87–132.
Plottu, E., Plottu, B., 2007. The consept of total economic value of environment – a
reconsideration within a hierarchical rationality. Ecol. Econ. 61, 52–61.
Purnhagen, K., 2014. The behavioural law and economics of the precautionary principle in
the EU and its impact on internal market regulation. J. Consum. Policy 37, 453–464.
Raffensperger, C., Tickner, J.A., 1999. Protecting Public Health and the Environment:
Implementing The Precautionary Principle. Island Press, Washington.
Randall, A., 1988. What mainstream economists have to say about the value of biodiver-
sity. In: Wilson, E.O. (Ed.), Biodiversity. National Academy Press, Washington,
pp. 217–223.
Raymond, C.M., et al., 2013. Ecosystem services and beyond: using multiple metaphors to
understand human-environment relationships. Bioscience 63, 536–546.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992;§15.
Rolston III, H., 1988. Environmental Ethics – Duties to and Values in The Natural World.
Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Samples, K., Hollyer, P., 1990. Contingent valuation of wildlife resources in the presence of
substitutes and complements. In: Johnson, R.L., Johnson, G.V. (Eds.), Economic
Valuation of Natural Resources. Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 177–192.
Sandin, P., 1999. Dimensions of the precautionary principle. Hum. Ecol. Risk. Assess.
5, 889–907.
Sandin, P., 2004a. Introduction. In: Sandin, P. (Ed.), Better Safe than Sorry. Theses in
Philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, pp. 1–8.Sandin, P., 2004b. The precautionary principle and the concept of precaution. Environ.
Values 13, 461–475.
Sandin, P., 2006. A paradox out of context: Harris and Holm on the precautionary
principle. Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 15, 175–180.
Sandin, P., et al., 2002. Five charges against the precautionary principle. Journal of
Risk Research 5, 287–290.
Söderbaum, P., 1987. Environmental management: a non-tradition al approach. J. Econ.
Iss. 21, 139–165.
Söderbaum, P., 1994. Actors, ideology, markets. neoclassical and institutional perspectives
on environmental policy. Ecol. Econ. 10, 47–60.
Steel, D., 2015. Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle – Science, Evidence, and
Environmental Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Stijkel, A., Reijnders, L., 1999. Implementation of the precautionary principle in standards
for the workplace. Occup. Environ. Med. 52, 304–312.
Sukhdev, P., 2010. Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A Synthesis of the Approach,
Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB. TEEB, Geneva.
Turner, D., Hartzell, L., 2004. The lack of clarity in the precautionary principle. Environ.
Values 13, 449–460.
von Krauss, M.K., Herremoës, P., 2001. MTBE in petrol as a substitute for lead. In:
Herremoës, P., et al. (Eds.), Late Lessons From Early Warnings – The Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000. European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, pp. 110–125.
Walsh, J.R., 2004. Major infrastructure projects, biodiversity and the precautionary
principle: the case of the Yacyretá dam and Iberá marshes. Review of European
Community and International Environmental Law 13, 61–71.
Wandall, B., 2004. Values in science and risk assessment. Toxicol. Lett. 152, 265–272.
Whiteside, K.H., 2006. Precautionary Politics. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Wilson, M.A., Howarth, R.B., 2002. Discourse-based valuation of ecosystem services:
establishing fair outcomes through group deliberation. Ecol. Econ. 41, 431–443.
Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle. 1998.
World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987. Our Common Future.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
